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1 
VACATING AN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AWARD RENDERED IN THE UNITED 
STATES: DOES THE NEW YORK CONVENTION, THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 
OR STATE LAW APPLY? 
By 
Lea Haber Kuck and Amanda Raymond Kalantirsky* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
When an international arbitration award is issued in the United States, and 
one party wants to have the award confirmed, enforced or vacated, three different 
bodies of law are potentially implicated: (1) the Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York Convention"),1 (2) the 
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"),2 and (3) state law. A recent decision by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Ario v. Underwriting 
Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds3 highlights the complex interaction of these 
laws in the context of an attempt to vacate an international award. The case 
demonstrates both why the parties' selection of the seat of an arbitration is critical 
and why parties must take care in drafting arbitration clauses. 
This article begins by examining the relevant provisions of the 
Convention, the FAA, and the role of state law. For an illustration of the interplay 
of these provisions, it then discusses the Third Circuit's decision in Ario, where the 
Third Circuit held that the grounds for vacatur of an international arbitration award 
issued in the United States are the same grounds as those applied to a domestic 
arbitration award. By this decision, the Third Circuit joined other circuits that have 
                                                 
* Lea Haber Kuck is a partner in the International Litigation and Arbitration Group of 
Skadden, Arps, Slate Meagher & Flom LLP. Amanda Raymond Kalantirsky is an associate 
in the group. Any views expressed herein are solely those of the authors and are not 
necessarily those of their firm or the firm's clients. 
 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]. 
 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, 201-08, 301-07 (2011). 
 Ario v. Underwriting Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds, 618 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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held that the grounds for vacatur set forth in the FAA applicable to domestic 
arbitration awards also apply to international arbitration awards rendered within 
the United States. However, a few courts have held that a motion to vacate an 
international award rendered in the United States should be decided only under the 
New York Convention's more limited grounds for review. The result of this split in 
the case law is that parties and practitioners must be aware of the jurisdiction 
within the United States where a motion to vacate an award is likely to be brought. 
As discussed below, whether the New York Convention or the FAA governs also 
has important implications with respect to certain procedural rules that apply to the 
application to vacate. 
 
II.  THE THREE BODIES OF LAW IMPLICATED BY A MOTION TO VACATE 
A.  The New York Convention 
The New York Convention, which has been in force in the United States 
for almost 40 years and has been ratified or acceded to by more than 140 countries, 
provides a relatively straightforward and effective mechanism for the enforcement 
of arbitral awards throughout the world. The goal of the New York Convention is 
"to encourage the recognition and enforcement of international arbitration awards 
and agreements";4 its "'underlying theme . . . as a whole is clearly the autonomy of 
international arbitration.'"5 
The New York Convention applies to (a) arbitral awards that are made in a 
country which is a party to the Convention other than the country where 
enforcement is sought, or (b) awards that are "not considered as domestic awards 
                                                 
 Jacada (Europe) Ltd. v. Int'l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d 701, 705 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 Gulf Petro Trading Co. v. Nigerian Nat'l Petroleum Corp., 512 F.3d 742, 746 (5th Cir. 
2008) (quoting PHILIPPE FOUCHARD, EMMANUEL GAILLARD & BERTHOLD GOLDMAN, 
FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION para. 
250 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999)). 
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in the [country] where their recognition and enforcement is sought."6 Thus, 
whether an award is considered international or domestic is determined by the law 
of the country where recognition or enforcement is sought, rather than the 
Convention. 
 
B.  The FAA 
In the United States, the New York Convention is implemented through 
the FAA. As the Supreme Court has explained, "Congress enacted the FAA to 
replace judicial indisposition to arbitration with a 'national policy favoring [it] and 
plac[ing] arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other contracts."7 The 
FAA consists of three chapters. Chapter 18 contains "a set of default rules 
'designed "to overrule the judiciary's longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to 
arbitrate"'";9 Chapter 2 implements the New York Convention and governs 
international or non-domestic awards; 10 and Chapter 3 provides for the 
enforcement of the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial 
Arbitration, also known as the Panama Convention,11 and sets forth the interplay 
between the New York Convention and the Panama Convention. 12 
                                                 
 New York Convention, supra note 1, art. I, 21 U.S.T. at 2519. This approach was adopted 
to accommodate a divergence of opinion between civil law countries, which considered 
"'the nationality of an award [to be] determined by the law governing the procedure,'" 
Jacada (Europe), 401 F.3d at 705 (quoting Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 
931 (2d Cir. 1983)), and common law countries, which "favored a simple rule under which 
an award was domestic in the country it was entered and foreign elsewhere." Id.  
 Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008) (alterations in original) 
(quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006)). 
 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. 
 Ario v. Underwriting Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds, 618 F.3d 277, 288 (3d Cir. 
2010) (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs.. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 
468, 474 (1989)). 
 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208. 
 Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 97-12, O.A.S.T.S. No. 42, 14 I.L.M. 336 [hereinafter Panama 
Convention]. The following states have ratified the Panama Convention: Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela. The only OAS 
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Chapter 2 defines what awards constitute international or non-domestic 
arbitration awards and are thus covered by the New York Convention: 
 
An arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a 
legal relationship, whether contractual or not, which is 
considered as commercial . . . falls under the Convention. An 
agreement or award arising out of such a relationship which 
is entirely between citizens of the United States shall be 
deemed not to fall under the Convention unless that 
relationship involves property located abroad, envisages 
performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other 
reasonable relation with one or more foreign states.13 
Application of Chapter 2 of the FAA is not limited to awards rendered outside the 
United States. Rather, under the FAA, an arbitration award issued in New York, in 
a commercial dispute governed by New York law, in favor of a New York citizen, 
would nevertheless be considered an international award if another party to the 
arbitration was not a U.S. citizen, or alternatively, if it involved a dispute relating 
to property or performance outside of the United States.14  
The FAA also provides, however, that "Chapter 1 [of the FAA, governing 
domestic disputes,] applies to actions and proceedings brought under [Chapter 2] 
to the extent that chapter is not in conflict with [Chapter 2] or the Convention as 
                                                                                                                            
member states that have not ratified the Convention are the Dominican Republic and 
Nicaragua. 
 9 U.S.C. §§ 301-307. 
 9 U.S.C. § 202. 
 See, e.g., Lander Co. v. MMP Invs., Inc., 107 F.3d 476-78, 481-82 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(award issued in New York in dispute between two U.S. firms for distribution of U.S.-
manufactured products in Poland found to be non-domestic under 9 U.S.C. § 202). See also 
Zeiler v. Deitsch, 500 F.3d 157, 164 (2d Cir. 2007) (arbitration was non-domestic, even 
though it took place in New York, where assets were located in Israel, some parties resided 
in Israel and governing law was based on a foreign system). 
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ratified by the United States."15 Thus, the federal law governing domestic 
arbitrations may also be implicated in connection with the judicial review of an 
international award. Then, as a result, state law may also come into play because, 
as discussed below, the FAA also permits parties to agree that state arbitration law 
will apply to certain aspects of their arbitration. 
 
C.  Recognition or Enforcement of an Award Under the New York Convention 
As discussed above, the New York Convention may apply to arbitration 
awards issued in the United States because some of these awards will be 
considered to be international or non-domestic under the FAA.16  
While the New York Convention sets forth the grounds on which a court 
may refuse to recognize or enforce an international award, it does not explicitly 
deal with the grounds that are available on a motion to vacate or set aside an 
arbitral award. The New York Convention provides that a court "shall recognize 
arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of 
procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon"17 unless the party against 
whom the award is invoked provides "proof" that one of seven limited grounds for 
non-recognition exists.18 One of the seven grounds set forth in Article V(1)(e) is 
                                                 
 9 U.S.C. § 208. 
 See 9 U.S.C. § 202; New York Convention, supra note 1, art. I(1), 21 U.S.T. at 2519. 
 New York Convention, supra note 1, art. III, 21 U.S.T. at 2519. 
 See id., art. V, 21 U.S.T. at 2520. Article V provides: 
 1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be 
refused, at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only 
if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the 
recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that: 
 (a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II 
were, under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or 
the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties 
have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law 
of the country where the award was made; or 
 (b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not 
given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the 
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that the award "has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the 
country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made."19  
Article V(1)(e) appears to draw a distinction between courts of the country 
"in which, or under the law of which, that award was made,"20 and courts of 
countries where enforcement of the award is sought. This divide has been 
recognized as creating a distinction between courts with "primary" jurisdiction 
(i.e., jurisdiction to set aside or vacate an arbitral award), and "secondary" 
jurisdiction (i.e., without jurisdiction to set aside or vacate an award, but with 
jurisdiction to deny enforcement of an award). As the Fifth Circuit has recognized, 
                                                                                                                            
arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his 
case; or 
 (c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by 
or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it 
contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission 
to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted 
to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that 
part of the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to 
arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or 
 (d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the 
arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the 
parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the 
law of the country where the arbitration took place; or 
 (e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, 
or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the 
country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.  
 2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may 
also be refused if the competent authority in the country where 
recognition and enforcement is sought finds that: 
 (a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of 
settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; or 
 (b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be 
contrary to the public policy of that country. 
Id. The grounds to refuse recognition of a foreign award under the New York Convention 
are identical to the grounds contained in the Panama Convention. See Panama Convention, 
supra note 12, art. 5. 
 New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1)(e), 21 U.S.T. at 2520; see also 9 U.S.C. § 
207. 
 New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1)(e), 21 U.S.T. at 2520. 
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"[o]nly a court in a country with primary jurisdiction over an arbitral award may 
annul that award."21  
The Convention contains no description of or limitation on the capacity of 
the jurisdiction where the award was rendered to apply its own law vacating the 
award.22 This means that the parties' choice of the seat of arbitration can have 
significant consequences for any judicial review of the award. According to one 
scholar, the Convention "entrusts the place of arbitration with significant power to 
enhance, or to impair, the international effectiveness of an award rendered within 
its territory. The ways courts at the arbitral seat exercise, or fail to exercise, their 
power to set an award aside generally will determine the award's international 
currency."23  
 
D.  Vacating an Arbitral Award in the United States 
For the reasons discussed above, in order for a party to invoke Article 
V(1)(e) of the New York Convention as a ground for denying enforcement of the 
award, an international award made in the United States would need to be vacated 
by a U.S. court under U.S. law.24 Under U.S. law, a threshold question arises as to 
whether a motion to vacate an award is governed by the FAA standards for vacatur 
or by the arbitration law of the state in which the award was made, or of the state 
whose law governs the parties' contract. Although the Supreme Court held in a 
                                                 
 Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 
364 F.3d 274, 287 (5th Cir. 2004); See also M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., 87 
F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 1996) ("We hold . . . that such a motion to vacate may be heard 
only in the courts of the country where the arbitration occurred or in the courts of any 
country whose procedural law was specifically invoked in the contract calling for 
arbitration of contractual disputes."). 
 See William W. Park, The International Currency of Arbitral Awards, in 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2007 309, 333 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course 
Handbook Series No. 756, 2007); see also George A. Bermann, Jurisdiction: Courts vs. 
Arbitrators, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN NEW YORK 135, 169 (James 
H. Carter & John Fellas eds., 2010). 
 WILLIAM W. PARK, INTERNATIONAL FORUM SELECTION 127 (1995). 
 See Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 21-23 
(2d Cir. 1997). 
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case involving a domestic arbitration that, as a general matter, the FAA does not 
preempt state law,25 in this specific context, the FAA standards for vacatur are 
widely recognized to preempt state grounds for vacatur unless the parties clearly 
provide otherwise in their agreement.26 
In Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,27 the Supreme Court 
expressly left open the possibility that parties may select state law to govern 
enforcement or vacatur of an arbitral award, stating: 
 
The FAA is not the only way into court for parties wanting 
review of arbitration awards: they may contemplate 
enforcement under state statutory or common law, for 
example, where judicial review of different scope is 
arguable. But here we speak only to the scope of the 
expeditious judicial review under §§ 9, 10, and 11 [of the 
FAA], deciding nothing about other possible avenues for 
judicial enforcement of arbitration awards.28 
Several Courts of Appeals have also contemplated that parties may displace the 
federal standard for vacatur with a state law standard, but only if they do so 
explicitly in their agreements.29 
                                                 
 See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 
(1989) ("The FAA contains no express pre-emptive provision, nor does it reflect a 
congressional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration"). 
 See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2565 (2009) ("It is 
well-settled that federal standards for vacatur under the FAA are preemptive under U.S. 
law, superseding more expansive grounds for vacatur under state law."); Ario v. 
Underwriting Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds, 618 F.3d 277, 292 (3d Cir. 2010) 
("'[T]he FAA standards control "in the absence of contractual intent to the contrary."'" 
(alteration in original) (quoting Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 296 
(3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 59 
(1995)))). 
 Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
 Id. at 590. 
 See, e.g., Ario v. Underwriting Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds for 1998 Year of 
Account, 618 F.3d 277, 292-93 (3d Cir. 2010); Jacada (Europe) Ltd. v. Int'l Mktg. 
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Assuming that the parties have not explicitly chosen a state law regime for 
vacatur, parties may move to vacate arbitral awards made in the United States 
under Section 10 of the FAA,30 which provides the exclusive grounds for vacatur 
of awards under the FAA.31 Under Section 10, a court may vacate an award for the 
following reasons: 
 
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or 
undue means; 
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the 
arbitrators, or either of them; 
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in 
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause 
shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material 
to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the 
rights of any party have been prejudiced; or 
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so 
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite 
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.32 
These grounds to vacate under the FAA overlap to a large extent with the grounds 
to deny enforcement contained in Article V of the Convention, but are also 
                                                                                                                            
Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d 701, 711-12 (6th Cir. 2005) (generic choice of law clause was not 
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the parties intended to displace the federal standard 
for vacatur); Action Indus., Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 358 F.3d 337, 342-43 (5th Cir. 
2004) (holding that agreement at issue's "choice-of-law provision [did] not express the 
parties' clear intent to depart from the FAA's vacatur standard").  
 9 U.S.C. § 10. 
 See Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 583-84. In Hall Street Associates, the Court held that 
parties could not expand the scope of judicial review under the FAA by contract. See id. at 
583-84 & n.5, 586-87. 
 9 U.S.C. § 10(a). 
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somewhat broader.33 For example, the FAA authorizes vacatur of an award for an 
arbitrator's refusal to postpone a hearing or refusal to hear pertinent evidence.34 By 
contrast, the New York Convention permits a court to deny recognition only where 
"the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the 
appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise 
unable to present his case."35 The inability to present one's case is a somewhat 
narrower ground than the ground for vacatur enunciated in the FAA.36 
Additionally, while there is currently a debate about whether "manifest disregard 
for the law" remains a viable ground for vacatur under the FAA after the Supreme 
Court's decision in Hall Street Associates,37 it is undoubtedly not a ground on 
which to deny enforcement under the Convention.38 
                                                 
 See Ario, 618 F.3d at 290 n.9.  
 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3). 
 New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1)(b), 21 U.S.T. at 2520. 
 On the other hand, because the grounds for vacating an arbitral award under the FAA 
and denying the recognition and enforcement of an award under the New York Convention 
are similar in some respects, whether the FAA or the New York Convention govern a 
motion to vacate may not have significant practical consequences in certain cases. See John 
V.H. Pierce & David N. Cinotti, Challenging and Enforcing International Arbitral Awards 
in New York Courts, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN NEW YORK 357, 
396 (James H. Carter & John Fellas eds., 2010). 
 Some courts have taken the view that "manifest disregard" is a non-statutory ground for 
review which is inconsistent with Hall Street Associates. See, e.g., Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. 
WW, L.L.C., 300 F. App'x 415, 418-19 (6th Cir. 2008). Others have concluded that 
"manifest disregard" refers collectively to the grounds for review in the FAA, and is 
therefore a "judicial gloss" on the statutory grounds for review which is no longer viable 
after Hall Street Associates. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 
F.3d 85, 94-95 (2d Cir. 2008), rev'd on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
38 See, e.g., M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., KG, 87 F.3d 844, 850-51 (6th Cir. 
1996); Int'l Trading & Indus. Inv. Co. v. DynCorp Aerospace Tech., No. 09-791 (RBW), 
2011 WL 192517, at *8-13 (D.D.C. Jan. 21, 2011). As the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia has recently observed: 
It should be no surprise, then, that [respondent] DynCorp has failed 
to cite any case law where the "manifest disregard for the law" 
standard has been considered an express or implied basis for 
denying recognition of an arbitral award under the New York 
Convention. Instead, the cases that DynCorp cites . . . all involve 
arbitral awards that have been rendered in the United States, 
thereby allowing the non-prevailing parties in those cases to seek 
vacatur of the award under Article V(1)(e) of the Convention. 
VACATING AN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AWARD  
 
11 
In addition, Section 12 of the FAA contains other rules governing a notice 
of a motion to vacate an award. Importantly, Section 12 requires that notice of a 
motion to vacate an award "must be served upon the adverse party or his attorney 
within three months after the award is filed or delivered."39  
 
III.  INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE NEW YORK CONVENTION AND U.S. DOMESTIC 
LAW 
A.  The Third Circuit’s Decision in Ario 
The Third Circuit’s recent decision in Ario v. Underwriting Members of 
Syndicate 53 at Lloyds40 illustrates the interplay between the principles discussed 
above as well as the importance of carefully drafting arbitration agreements.41 The 
case involved four reinsurance contracts, or “treaties,” between two Pennsylvania 
insurance companies (the “Insurers”) and the Underwriting Members of Syndicate 
53 at Lloyd’s for the 1998 Year of Account (the “Reinsurers”), who were mostly 
British.42 At the time of the lawsuit, the Insurers were in liquidation and 
represented by Joel Ario, the Insurance Commissioner of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania as statutory liquidator.43 
The arbitration clause provided that “[a]rbitration hereunder shall take 
place in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania unless both parties otherwise agree. Except as 
hereinabove provided, the arbitration shall be in accordance with the rules and 
procedures established by the Uniform Arbitration Act as enacted in 
Pennsylvania.”44 The arbitrators issued an “unreasoned award” rescinding three of 
the four reinsurance treaties, which did not provide a rationale or identify the 
                                                                                                                            
Int'l Trading & Indus. Inv. Co., 2011 WL 192517, at *11. 
39 9 U.S.C. § 12. 
40 618 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 2010). 
41 See id. at 288-96. 
42 Id. at 283 & n.2. 
43 Id. at 283. 
44 Id. at 284. 
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evidence on which it was based.45 The Insurers then filed a motion to confirm in 
part and vacate in part the award in Pennsylvania state court. The Reinsurers 
removed the case to federal district court and filed a motion to confirm the award.46 
The parties agreed that the award was subject to the New York Convention, but 
they disagreed about the applicability of the FAA and Pennsylvania state law.47 
Ario argued that the parties had opted out of the FAA entirely by their 
choice of the rules and procedures established by the Pennsylvania Uniform 
Arbitration Act (“PUAA”)48 to govern the arbitration, and that the federal court 
thus lacked subject matter jurisdiction.49 The district court held that it had 
jurisdiction over the case because the case related to an arbitration award falling 
under the Convention.50 After the district court denied his motion to remand, Ario 
argued that his motion to vacate was governed by the standards in PUAA rather 
than the more stringent vacatur standards in the FAA. The district court concluded 
that its review was governed by the FAA rather than PUAA, denied the motion to 
vacate, and confirmed the award.51 
The Third Circuit affirmed, with one dissent, the judgment confirming the 
award,52 holding that (1) parties may not “opt out” of the FAA, but the FAA 
permits the parties to waive the right of removal as long as they do so in “clear and 
unambiguous language” (although the court concluded the parties did not do so in 
this case);53 and (2) that the FAA, rather than the Convention or PUAA, provided 
the standards for vacatur.54 
                                                 
45 Ario, 618 F.3d at 286. 
46 Id.  
47 Id. 
48 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7301-7320 (West 2007). 
49 Ario, 618 F.3d at 286. 
50 Id.  
51 Id. at 287. 
52 It reversed, however, the district court's award of sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11 against Ario and his counsel. Id. at 283. 
53 Id. at 288-90. 
54 Ario, 618 F.3d at 290-95. 
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On the first point, the Third Circuit quoted the Supreme Court’s statement 
that “when ‘parties have agreed to abide by state rules of arbitration, enforcing 
those rules according to the terms of the agreement is fully consistent with the 
goals of the FAA.’”55 Thus, it held: 
 
An agreement by parties to apply the rules and procedures of 
state law operates neither as an “opt out” of the domestic 
FAA nor as an “opt out” of the Convention’s implementing 
legislation. It is federal law that allows the parties to make 
and enforce agreements that fall under the FAA or the 
Convention.56 
It held that “although Volt [and a later Supreme Court decision] addressed only the 
domestic FAA, the principles undergirding those decisions apply to the 
Convention’s implementing legislation.”57 However, because of the “’strong and 
clear preference for a federal forum,’” the Third Circuit applied a “strict standard,” 
requiring “’clear and unambiguous language’” evidencing a waiver of the right to 
remove.58 
After concluding that the parties in the case before it did not “clearly and 
unambiguously” agree to waive the right of removal, the Third Circuit considered 
whether the FAA “domestic” vacatur standards applied to a “Convention award 
rendered and enforced in the United States.”59 It recognized that “if vacatur is 
limited to the grounds listed in the Convention, Ario would have little chance of 
success.”60 
                                                 
55 Id. at 288 (quoting Volt Info. Scia., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 
U.S. 468, 479 (1989)). 
56 Id. at 289. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. (quoting Suter v. Munich Reinsurance Co., 223 F.3d 150, 158 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
59 Ario, 618 F.3d at 290-92. 
60 Id. at 291. 
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The Third Circuit adopted the reasoning and holding of the Second Circuit 
in Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons Co., W.L.L. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc.,61 the seminal 
case on the issue of the law applicable to a motion to vacate a non-domestic 
arbitration award rendered in the United States. Toys “R” Us has been widely cited 
for the proposition that a motion to vacate an international or non-domestic arbitral 
award rendered in the United States is governed by Chapter 1 of the FAA.62 
In Toys “R” Us, the Second Circuit reasoned: “We read Article V(1)(e) of 
the Convention to allow a court in the country under whose law the arbitration was 
conducted to apply domestic arbitral law, in this case the FAA, to a motion to set 
aside or vacate that arbitral award.”63 The Second Circuit summarized the 
framework of the New York Convention by concluding that the Convention: 
 
mandates very different regimes for the review of arbitral 
awards (1) in the state in which, or under the law of which, 
the award was made, and (2) in other states where 
recognition and enforcement are sought. The Convention 
specifically contemplates that the state in which, or under the 
law of which, the award is made, will be free to set aside or 
modify an award in accordance with its domestic arbitral law 
and its full panoply of express and implied grounds for 
relief.64 
                                                 
61 Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons Co., W.L.L. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 
1997) [hereinafter Toys "R" Us]. 
62 The Toys "R" Us case arose out of a contract between Toys "R" Us and a Kuwaiti 
company, Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons Co., W.L.L. ("Alghanim"), to open Toys "R" 
Us stores around the Middle East. When a dispute arose after Toys "R" Us attempted to 
terminate the agreement, the parties initiated arbitration under the auspices of the American 
Arbitration Association. The arbitrator rendered an award in favor of Alghanim. Alghanim 
petitioned the district court to confirm the award under the New York Convention, and 
Toys "R" Us cross-moved to vacate or modify the award. Id. at 17-18. 
63 Id. at 21. 
64 Id. at 23. 
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It drew support from scholarly literature interpreting Article V(1)(e), noting that 
“[t]here appears to be no dispute among these authorities that an action to set aside 
an international arbitral award, as contemplated by Article V(1)(e), is controlled by 
the domestic law of the rendering state.”65 The court also reasoned from the history 
of the New York Convention that it was not meant “to deprive the rendering state 
of its supervisory authority over an arbitral award, including its authority to set 
aside that award under domestic law.”66 
In Ario, the Third Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit that Article V of 
the Convention specifically contemplates that the country in which the award is 
made is free to vacate or set aside an arbitral award in accordance with its domestic 
                                                 
65 Id. at 21; see also id. at 22 ("'[T]he Convention is not applicable in the action for setting 
aside the award.'" (quoting ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION 
CONVENTION OF 1958: TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 20 (1981))); id. 
("'[T]he fact is that setting aside awards under the New York Convention can take place 
only in the country in which the award was made.'" (quoting Jan Paulsson, The Role of 
Swedish Courts in Transnational Commercial Arbitration, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 211, 242 
(1981))); id. at 22-23: 
[Article V(1)(e)] fails to specify the grounds upon which the 
rendering State may set aside or suspend the award. While it would 
have provided greater reliability to the enforcement of awards 
under the Convention had the available grounds been defined in 
some way, such action would have constituted meddling with 
national procedure for handling domestic awards, a subject beyond 
the competence of the Conference. 
quoting Leonard V. Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 
1049, 1070 (1961). 
66 Toys "R" Us, Inc.,126 F.3d at 22. The Second Circuit reaffirmed its holding Zeiler v. 
Deitsch, 500 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2007). In Zeiler, the court reviewed a district court decision 
vacating certain arbitration awards and confirming other awards made by the same tribunal. 
The lower court appeared to have considered only Article V in its decision. On review, the 
Second Circuit commented on the "double role" of the reviewing court where the court was 
asked to confirm a non-domestic arbitration award falling under the Convention, as well as 
serving as an authority under Article V(1)(e) "authorized under Chapter 1 of the FAA to 
vacate arbitration awards entered in the United States." Id. at 165 n.6. The Second Circuit 
explained that the district court should not have vacated the awards on the basis of Article 
V(1)(d) because neither the Convention nor Chapter 2 of the FAA grant the power to 
vacate non-domestic awards. Id. Rather, the lower court should have analyzed the vacatur 
motion under Section 10 of the FAA. Id. 
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arbitration law.67 Because Article V(1)(e) incorporates the domestic FAA with 
respect to motions to set aside awards, the court concluded that there is no conflict 
between the Convention and the FAA.68 
The Third Circuit then turned to the question of whether, under the FAA, 
the parties could displace the federal vacatur standards with the state law standards 
in the PUAA. As the dissent recognized, the answer to this question was 
significant. The dissent explained: The FAA standards still rigorously limit judicial 
intervention, requiring challengers to show the award was “completely irrational,” 
a near prohibitive burden. Under the PUAA by contrast, a court may modify or 
correct an award that is “contrary to the law.” 69 
The Third Circuit ruled that parties could do so: [T]he domestic FAA 
allows parties to agree to apply state law enforcement mechanisms in lieu of the 
FAA default rules. Of course, “[t]he FAA is not the only way into court for parties 
wanting review of arbitration awards,” and parties “may contemplate enforcement 
under state statutory or common law.” 70 It held, however, that in order to displace 
the “’FAA standards [which] control in the absence of contractual intent to 
contrary[,]’”71 it would “require the parties to express a ‘clear intent’ to apply state 
law vacatur standards instead of those of the FAA.”72 
                                                 
67 Ario, 618 F.3d at 292. 
68 Id. at 292. 
69 Id. at 298 (Aldisert, J., dissenting in part) (citations omitted) (citing Mut. Fire, Marine & 
Inland Ins. Co. v. Norad Reinsurance Co., 868 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir.1989); 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. 
Ann. §§ 7301(d)(2) & 7314(a)). The Third Circuit recognized that in Hall Street 
Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 590 (2008), the "Supreme Court addressed 
only the narrow question of whether the parties could agree to modify the FAA's 
confirmation, vacatur and modification standards [set forth in 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 10 and 11], 
concluding that they 'provide exclusive regimes for the review provided by statute,' and 
thus could not be altered by the parties." Id. at 292 n.11 (majority opinion) (quoting Hall 
St. Assocs., 522 U.S. at 590). The court in Ario held, however, that "Hall Street says 
nothing about using the alternate avenue of 9 U.S.C. § 205 for judicial enforcement of an 
arbitration award falling under the Convention, and does not support Ario's arguments that 
the FAA is entirely displaced." Id. 
70 Id. at 292 (second alteration in original) (quoting Hall St. Assocs., 522 U.S. at 590). 
71 Id. (quoting Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 296 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
72 Ario, 618 F.3d at 293 (citing Roadway Package Sys., 257 F.3d at 288, 293, 295). 
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The majority of the court then determined that the arbitration agreement in 
issue did not evince a “clear intent” to apply the vacatur standards in the PUAA to 
the exclusion of the FAA.73 It concluded that while “there is a plausible argument 
that the parties may have agreed to apply PUAA standards, it falls short of the 
‘clear intent’ we demand.”74 It interpreted the arbitration provisions, which stated 
that the arbitration “shall be in accordance with the rules and procedures 
established by the Uniform Arbitration Act as enacted in Pennsylvania,”75 “[to be] 
concerned with only the conduct of the arbitration itself, not judicial enforcement 
of a resulting award.”76 The dissent agreed with the majority’s recitation of the 
law, but disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of the arbitration agreement, 
reasoning that the PUAA’s “rules and procedures” included rules of judicial 
vacatur.77 
 
B. Ario Reflects the Majority View 
The holding of the Third Circuit in Ario and the Second Circuit in Toys 
"R" Us that a motion to vacate an international award rendered in the United States 
is governed by the domestic standards for vacatur set forth in Chapter 1 of the 
FAA reflects the majority view. 
The Sixth Circuit likewise decided in Jacada (Europe) Ltd. v. 
International Marketing Strategies, Inc. (Europe)78 that the FAA grounds for 
domestic vacatur development company from the United Kingdom and a 
marketing firm from Michigan. After arbitration in Michigan under the auspices of 
the American Arbitration Association, the tribunal issued an award in which it 
expressly disregarded a limitation on liability provision in the contract and issued 
                                                 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 284. 
76Id. at 294. 
77 Ario, 618 F.3d at 299 (Aldisert, J., dissenting in part). 
78 401 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 2005). 
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an award in favor of IMS.79 Jacada filed a petition to vacate the award in state 
court, and a few hours later IMS filed a petition to confirm the award in federal 
court.80 The federal case was stayed, and the state case was transferred and then 
removed to federal district court.81  
The federal district court ruled that the Convention was applicable to the 
dispute and therefore that the action was properly removed, a decision upheld by 
the Sixth Circuit.82 The court then addressed Jacada's petition to vacate the award. 
It began its analysis with the language of Article V(1)(e) and held that "[b]ecause 
this award was made in the United States, we can apply domestic law, found in the 
FAA, to vacate the award."83  
The Sixth Circuit distinguished its prior holding in M & C Corp. v. Erwin 
Behr GmbH & Co., KG,84 which "held that a party seeking to vacate an arbitral 
award was limited to raising the exclusive grounds found in Article V of the 
Convention because the FAA does not apply to cases under the Convention if the 
FAA is 'in conflict' with the Convention or its implementing legislation."85 The 
court distinguished this holding on the grounds that M & C dealt with an award 
that had been rendered in the United Kingdom. In Jacada, the award was rendered 
in the United States and Article V(1)(e) therefore authorized the application of 
domestic law.86  
Other circuits have stated in dicta that motions to vacate international 
arbitral awards are reviewed under the FAA vacatur standards, rather than under 
the grounds in Article V of the New York Convention for denying enforcement of 
                                                 
79 Id. at 703-04. 
80 Id. at 704. 
81 Id.  
82 Id. at 704-09. 
83 Id. at 709. 
84 87 F.3d 844 (6th Cir. 1996). 
85 401 F.3d at 709 n.8. 
86 Id. The court also addressed whether the parties had agreed to "opt out" of the FAA in 
favor of Michigan's law, which provided a "more thorough standard of review," and 
concluded that the "generic choice-of-law provision" in the contract was insufficient to opt 
out of the federal vacatur standard of review. Id. at 710. 
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an award. For example, the Seventh Circuit noted in passing in Lander Co. v. 
MMP Investments, Inc. that the New York Convention "contemplates the 
possibility of the award's being set aside in a proceeding under local law."87  
The Fifth Circuit Court addressed the interaction of the New York 
Convention and the FAA in greater detail in the Gulf Petro Trading Co. case.88 
That case involved a dispute over a joint venture between Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), owned by the government of Nigeria, and Petrec, 
a division of a U.S. company.89 The arbitral tribunal rendered two decisions: a 
"Partial Award" finding that Petrec had standing to submit its claims and that 
NNPC had not fulfilled its obligation under the joint venture agreement, and a 
"Final Award," finding that Petrec in fact did not have standing to sustain its 
claims against NNPC.90 Petrec made an application before the Swiss Federal Court 
to set aside the Final Award, but the Swiss court confirmed the award.91 Petrec 
then filed a claim in the Northern District of Texas to enforce the Partial Award 
and set aside or modify the Final Award. The district court determined that by 
seeking to enforce the Partial Award, Petrec was really seeking to annul the Final 
Award, because the findings of the Partial Award had been essentially vacated by 
the arbitral tribunal in the Final Award. Because the New York Convention does 
not authorize secondary jurisdictions – i.e., jurisdictions other than the jurisdiction 
where the award was made – to vacate or annul awards, the district court held that 
it was precluded from granting the relief sought by Petrec.92 The district court held 
that "United States federal courts cannot set aside or modify an arbitral award 
                                                 
87 107 F.3d 476, 478 (7th Cir. 1997). 
88 Gulf Petro Trading Co. v. Nigerian Nat'l Petroleum Corp., 512 F.3d 742 (5th Cir. 2008); 
Gulf Petro Trading Co. v. Nigerian Nat'l Petroleum Corp., 288 F. Supp. 2d 783 (N.D. Tex. 
2003), aff'd, 115 F. App'x 201 (5th Cir. 2004). 
89 Gulf Petro Trading Co., 512 F.3d at 744.  
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Gulf Petro Trading Co., 288 F. Supp. 2d at 792. 
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made in another nation," and therefore do not have subject matter jurisdiction over 
such claims.93 
After the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's determination that it could 
not set aside or modify the Final Award because it had only secondary jurisdiction, 
Petrec filed suit in the Eastern District of Texas, claiming that the arbitral award 
was the result of bribery and fraud,94 and asserting statutory claims under the U.S. 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and the Texas 
Deceptive Trade Practices Consumer Protection Act, and common law claims for 
fraud and civil conspiracy.95 The district court determined, and the Fifth Circuit 
agreed, that all of Gulf Petro's claims in this second lawsuit constituted a collateral 
attack on the Final Award, because the harm that Gulf Petro suffered was a result 
of the arbitral award against it, not the alleged bribery itself.96 Because a "court 
sitting in secondary jurisdiction lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claims 
seeking to vacate, set aside, or modify a foreign arbitral award," the Fifth Circuit 
dismissed all of Gulf Petro's claims.97 
Finally, the D.C. Circuit held in TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P. 
that "[u]nder the [New York] Convention, the power and authority of the local 
courts of the rendering state remain of paramount importance.'"98 It noted that the 
New York Convention did not "'"provide any international mechanism to insure 
the validity of the award where rendered. This was left to the provisions of local 
law. The Convention provides no restraint whatsoever on the control functions of 
local courts at the seat of arbitration."'"99  
 
                                                 
93 Id. 
94 Gulf Petro Trading Co., 512 F.3d at 745. 
95Id. at 749. 
96 Id. at 750. 
97 Id. at 747. 
98 TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 939 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting 
Alghanim, 126 F.3d at 22). 
99 Id. (quoting Alghanim, 126 F.3d at 22). 
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C.  The Eleventh Circuit's Contrary View  
The Eleventh Circuit has taken a different approach than the cases 
discussed above. In Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte 
GmbH,100 it considered an appeal from a denial of a motion to vacate the arbitral 
award made in the United States that it concluded was a non-domestic award 
governed by the Convention because one of the parties was a non-U.S. party.101  
The court then addressed the appellant's three theories for why the award 
should be vacated, and used the terminology for vacating an award and denying 
enforcement of an award interchangeably. Although the appeal was of the denial of 
a motion to vacate an award, the court began its analysis by stating: "The Tampa 
panel's arbitral award must be confirmed unless appellants can successfully assert 
one of the seven defenses against enforcement of the award enumerated in Article 
V of the New York Convention."102  
The Eleventh Circuit declined to vacate the arbitral award because the 
ground advanced by the party seeking vacatur was not contained in Article V of 
the Convention.103 The court analyzed the distinction between the regime 
governing vacatur of domestic arbitration awards and non-domestic awards. It 
concluded that the reasons for vacatur of domestic awards included the four 
grounds enumerated in the FAA and two non-statutory defenses against 
enforcement, namely that an award is "arbitrary and capricious" or enforcement 
would be against public policy.104 The court contrasted this regime for vacatur with 
the defenses against enforcement of an award contained in the Convention, and 
quoted the Second Circuit's opinion in Toys "R" Us for the proposition that the 
grounds to deny enforcement of an award "'enumerated in Article V of the 
                                                 
100 Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434 (11th Cir. 
1998). 
101 Id. at 1441. 
102 Id. (emphasis added). 
103 Id. at 1445. 
104 Id. at 1445-46. 
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Convention are the only grounds available for setting aside an arbitral award.'"105 It 
held that "the Convention's enumeration of defenses is exclusive," and that Chapter 
1 of the FAA was inapplicable to a motion to vacate an arbitral award that falls 
under the New York Convention.106  
A district court within the Eleventh Circuit has noted that Industrial Risk 
Insurers and Toys "R" Us appear to be at odds with each other.107 The court noted 
that Toys "R" Us recognized "that grounds other than those set forth in the New 
York Convention may apply to a motion to set aside or vacate a foreign arbitral 
award rendered in the United States," but declined to rely on Toys “R” Us  because 
it was "not binding law . . . and appears to be contrary to [Industrial Risk 
Insurers]."108 
Another federal district court sitting in Virginia similarly held, in RZS 
Holdings AVV v. PDVSA Petroleos S.A., 109 that Chapter 1 of the FAA does not 
apply to international awards rendered in the United States. The court was 
presented with a petition to vacate an award on the basis that one or both parties 
had received a draft of the award prior to its publication, one of the arbitrators 
attended a conference with an attorney from the prevailing party, and the 
prevailing party paid the entire cost of the arbitration.110 The court denied the 
petition because none of the grounds presented in support of the petition were 
contained in Article V of the Panama Convention, which is nearly identical to 
Article V of the New York Convention.111 It held that there was a conflict between 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 3 of the FAA, which implements the Panama Convention, 
based upon its "reading of the language of 9 U.S.C. § 207 that indicates that the 
                                                 
105 Id. at 1446 (quoting Toys "R" Us, 126 F.3d at 20). 
106 Id.  
107 See Nicor Int'l Corp. v. El Paso Corp., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1168 n.7 (S.D. Fla. 2004). 
108 Id. 
109 RZS Holdings AVV v. PDVSA Petroleos S.A., 598 F. Supp. 2d 762 (E.D. Va. 2009), 
aff'd, 383 F. App'x 281 (4th Cir. 2010). 
110 Id. at 768. 
111 Id. at 767. 
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reasons enumerated in Article V of the [Panama] Convention provide the exclusive 
list of grounds to vacate international arbitration awards."112 
 
D. Practical Considerations in Seeking To Vacate an Award: The Timing 
Trap 
The FAA contains a strict three-month deadline for parties to move to 
vacate arbitral awards: "Notice of a motion to vacate, modify, or correct an award 
must be served upon the adverse party or his attorney within three months after the 
award is filed or delivered."113 If Chapter 1 of the FAA applies to awards covered 
by the New York Convention, then this limitations period likewise applies.114 
Many state statutes also have very short deadlines for seeking vacatur.115 This is in 
contrast to the three years permitted under the Convention for a party to seek 
confirmation of an award.116  
If a party does not move to vacate an award within the three-month time 
frame, it cannot seek to do so later when faced with a motion to confirm the 
award.117 Accordingly, a party who intends to seek to vacate an international award 
rendered in the United States must move quickly and may not wait until the 
prevailing party seeks confirmation of the award. 
If a party chooses not to vacate or misses the deadline, then its only option 
is to wait for the opposing party to attempt to confirm or enforce that award under 
the New York Convention, and attempt to resist confirmation or enforcement. As 
discussed above, however, under the New York Convention, a court must confirm 
                                                 
112 Id. at 766-67. 
113 9 U.S.C. § 12. 
114 See Republic of Arg. v. BG Group PLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 108, 120 n.10 (D.D.C. 2010). 
115 See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7314(b) (2007) (30 days); FLA. STAT. § 682.13(2) 
(2003) (90 days); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7511(a) (McKinney Supp. 2011) (90 days). 
116 9 U.S.C. § 207 ("Within three years after an arbitral award falling under the Convention 
is made, any party to the arbitration may apply to any court having jurisdiction under this 
chapter for an order confirming the award as against any other party to the arbitration."). 
117 See Lander Co. v. MMP Invs., Inc., 107 F.3d 476, 478 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Taylor 
v. Nelson, 788 F.2d 220, 225 (4th Cir. 1986); Florasynth v. Pickholz, 750 F.2d 171, 174-77 
(2d Cir. 1984). 
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the award unless the party opposing confirmation proves "one of the grounds for 
refusal or denial of recognition or enforcement of the award specified" in the New 
York Convention exists.118 If a party does not move to vacate an award within the 
three-month time limit, then it would only have available the Article V grounds to 
resist enforcement of the award, not the Chapter 1 grounds under the FAA to 
vacate the award. 
Moreover, it is not necessary for a party to confirm the award in the United 
States before seeking to enforce the award elsewhere. 119 As the Second Circuit has 
explained: "While the distinction between vacation of an arbitration award and 
refusal to confirm an award may be of negligible significance within the United 
States, it can affect the remaining force of an unconfirmed award outside this 




Parties choosing the United States as the place of their international 
commercial arbitrations need to understand the interplay between the Convention, 
the FAA and state law and to consider the issues discussed above both at the time 
they draft their arbitration agreements and after an award is entered. Parties who 
are not aware of these issues may lose their opportunity to have an award entered 
against them vacated based on grounds in the FAA, or on more lenient state law 
grounds, which may not be available under the New York Convention. 
                                                 
118 See 9 U.S.C. § 207. 
119 See, e.g., Oriental Commercial & Shipping Co., (U.K.), Ltd. v. Rosseel, N.V., 769 F. 
Supp. 514, 516-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). In Oriental Commercial, the court noted that parties 
obtaining an international arbitral award in the United States have two options. They can 
seek to have the award confirmed by a U.S. court and enforce it elsewhere as a foreign 
judgment. Alternatively, they can go directly to a court outside of the United States and 
seek enforcement of the award under the New York Convention. Id. 
120 Zeiler v. Deitsch, 500 F.3d 157, 165 n.6 (2d Cir. 2007). 
